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Great Leaps Backward: Poverty under Mao 
 




  1. The issue 
  China had a long history of premodern growth in just about all categories: empire building 
and expansion, high yield agriculture, a wide range of inventions and innovations, impressive 
commercialisation and proto-industrialisation, a very strong foreign trade record and a 
comfortable living standard.1 However, all these were ruthlessly challenged by the rise of 
Western capitalism marked by the opium trade and the First Opium War (1840). If imperial 
China was noted as a country of political and socio-economic equilibrium,2 modern China 
since the Opium War has been a place of swinging changes. Mao’s era from 1949 to 1978 
was such a period.3
  At the heart of the changes, it is the issue of what new developmental path China needs to 
adopt in order to adapt to the altered world order and, if possible, to catch up with the 
wealthy West. The choices available are demonstrated in Figure 1. The choices available to 
post-Opium War China were of three types: first, the classical and neo-classical ‘weak state–
rich population’ type; second, the ‘strong state–poor population’ type which was shared by 
Russia (under the Tsars and again under Lenin and Stalin) and Japan (Meiji); third, the 
‘strong state–rich population’ type under the Western welfare system. Since China fell in the 
most inferior position of ‘weak state–poor population’, it could only go up. Thus, post-
                                                 
1 Numerous works document this, see for example, Needham 1954–94; Skinner 1964–6, 1971; Fairbank 1965; 
Hartwell 1966; Myers 1970; Elvin 1973; Feuerwerker 1976, 1984; Chao 1986; Gates 1996; Deng 1997a, 
1997b, 1999a; Pomeranz 2000. 
2 Deng 1999b. 
3 Mao’s era included the brief interim leadership under Mao’s hand-picked successor Hua Guofeng. 2 
Opium War China had the ‘advantage of backwardness’ (Gerschenkron 1962). And, the 
opportunity costs for China to move were extremely low (see Panel A of Figure 1). 
 In reality, the classical, neo-classical choice of ‘weak state–rich population’ was 
unachievable, so the feasible choices were just two. There is little doubt that the early 
changes associated with the Westernisation Movement (yangwu yundong) and the 1911 
Nationalist Revolution pushed China in the direction of the ‘strong state–poor population’ 
type. The question here is whether Mao Zedong’s leadership changed this pattern for the 
better (see Panel B of Figure 1). 
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Note: Solid arrow – commonly agreed change in history. Broken arrow – claims to be tested. a – China first 
move; b – China’s second move. 3 
 
  2. Historical background of Mao’s regime 
  a. Chinese nationalism 
  In nature, the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was more of a 
victory of nationalism than communism. The recovery of China's national sovereignty (in 
which the communists claimed a considerable share in the heroic war against Japanese 
invasion and conquest) and the re-unification of the country after the long lasting civil wars 
(in which the communists finally succeeded) were both categorically nationalist goals. 
During the Period of Recovery of the National Economy (1949–52), nationalism prevailed in 
terms of the establishment of law and order, implementation of land reform, balancing of the 
state budget, stabilisation of price, nationalisation of the main industries and so forth.  
  On the diplomatic and national defence fronts, for example, nationalism has been the 
keynote of the People's Republic. Until the 1970s, China spared no effort to ally with the 
nationalist Third World. China broke away with the Soviet Camp in the early 1960s because 
of the alleged 'Socialistic Imperialism' of the latter. Military strength was given national 
priority. As a result, China was the first developing country to possess nuclear and space 
technologies. Nationalist colours were repeatedly shown in four military confrontations 
along China's boarders: the Korean War (1950–3), Sino-Indian War (1962), Sino-Soviet War 
(1969) and Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). So, the early overwhelming popularity of the 
Communist Party and the People's Republic was largely based on this nationalist thrust.  
  It is not so surprising that it was not until the mid-1950s, some three decades after the 
establishment of the Chinese Communist Party, that it promoted a communist programme on 
a large scale. After the mid-1950s, although Mao’s programme had distinctive traces of 
practices from the Soviet Union, it was always heavily entwined with Chinese nationalism. 
 
  b. Choice of the Stalinist type 
  A communist/socialist approach was quite successful in Mao’s China. It was not because it 
had been tested in China and proved successful. Rather, it was because the model had not 
been tested before while other models (mainly Westernisation and Nationalism) had been 
proven ineffective in helping the country out of weakness, poverty, inequality and 
underdevelopment. The ‘demonstration effect’ from the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany 
during World War Two, and the political alignment between the Western and Eastern camps 
after the world war, and especially after the Korean War, helped a great deal in persuading 
the Chinese population and thus made Mao’s choice of the Stalinist type a much easier task. 
  In addition, there was a hidden agenda of populism and egalitarianism which had a longer 
tradition in China than either nationalism or communism but which overlapped with 4 
communism in particular.4 In Mao’s later year, populism and egalitarianism eventually took 
over (Hu 1999). This is however beyond the scope of this essay. 
 
                                                 
4 This overlapping has been coined as ‘pseudo-communism’ in post-Mao China. 5 
 c.  State-determinism 
  The whole of Mao’s era was marked by the belief in and practice of a top-down state-
determinism. The function of the market was marginalised or simply eliminated. 
  This state-determinism was most obvious from the radical changes on the political and 
ideological fronts. Politically, although by definition contradicting ‘republicanism’, the 
adoption of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s thought as the state philosophies 
rationalised the one-party system. The abandonment of China’s traditional examination 
system for civil servants facilitated proletarian dictatorship. The effectiveness of this 
dictatorship was demonstrated in six nation-wide purges to eliminate any potential 
competing power centre against party rule: the Movement against Three and Five Evils 
(sanfan wufan, 1951–2), Anti-Rightist Struggle (fanyou, known as ‘One Hundred Flowers 
Movement’, 1957), Socialist Educational Drive (shejiao, also known as ‘Four Cleansings’ 
siqing, 1964–5), the Cultural Revolution (wenge, 1966–76), and the Suppressions of the ‘5 
April Protest’ (siwu shijian, known as the ‘Tian-anmen Incident’, 1976). In addition, to 
eliminate different opinions and factions from within the party, there was more frequent 
party consolidation and party rectification which always affected state policy and 
governmental personnel. From 1949 to 1976, in his capacity as the lifetime Chairman of the 
Communist Party, Mao Zedong was in firm control of the party, the military, the state and 
the population in the fashion of theocracy.  
  All these necessarily strengthened the Maoist state politically. 
 
B. Mao’s ideal versus the general track record 
 
  1. Mao’s ideal  
  Mao’s communism promised an enriching egalitarianism with a better material life for 
everyone: employment, education, health care, pensions and so forth, a new equilibrium.5 
Economically, China had an extensive programme for industrialisation under a series of five-
year economic plans. In theory, these five-year plans were also developmental, allegedly 
aiming at bridging the ‘three major gaps’ (sanda chabie) between the industrial workers’ 
class and the peasantry, between urban life and rural life and between mental labour and 
manual labour. This generated short-term incentives among the population to work hard in 
the early years of the regime. This also eased the pain of rapid and sweeping nationalisation 
of private and corporate industrial assets (which affected the urban elite) and brutal 
collectivisation (which affected the rural masses).  
                                                 
5 But, according to the Marxian doctrine of ‘depriving the exploiter’, this process will never be of a Pareto 
optimum as the old elite is targeted and inevitably worse off. 6 
 
  2. General track record 
  In reality, a range of concessions was made from the ideal. Industrialisation and self-
reliance, or simply ‘self-reliant industrialisation’ was given state priority during the whole 
Mao’s era. This inevitably deviated from Mao’s promotion of an enriching egalitarianism 
with a better material life for everyone. This was the case of Mao’s institutional reform in a 
wholesale package of collectivisation in the mid-1950s in both rural and urban China to 
make the agricultural and service sectors compatible with the state-run industrial sector 
which was established through the nationalisation of private and corporate industrial assets. 
It has been commonly agreed that this move was at least too far ahead of its time, if not 
completely flawed. Society was not ready for the changes. 
  The following ‘Great Leap Forward’ (dayuejin) during the later 1950s fantasised the 
possibility of ‘surpassing Great Britain and catching up with the United States’ (chaoying 
ganmei), and ‘dashing into communism’ (paobu jinru gongchanzhuyi). Breaking all the 
‘natural laws’ governing people’s incentives to produce and invest, the ‘Great Leap Forward’ 
ended tragically in ‘Great Steps Backward’ marked by forced proto-industrialisation in the 
form of premodern, small scale, back-yard furnaces and mass starvation and extensive de-
industrialisation and de-urbanisation. 
  As the economy and people’s morale barely recovered after 1963, Mao launched his ten-
year long Cultural Revolution, the deed that he was most proud of in his life. From the 
extensive political and economic damage inflicted by the Cultural Revolution, the Maoist 
state unmistakably stopped from behaving as a developmental state. Rather, the regime 
began to show its all-rounded developmental illiteracy. The economy was virtually on the 
brink of total self-destruction with the standards of living among ordinary people pushed 
back decades. 
  Obviously, the gap between Mao’s ideal and the general track record of the economy under 
Mao’s rule was simply nonnegotiable. However, this essay will not concentrate on the 
impact of man-made disasters during Mao’s period. Rather, it will look at development in its 
entirety to sketch out the direction of the economy and how beneficial the growth was for the 
general public during that era. 
  
C. Growth/developmental strategy: unbalanced growth with ISI 
 
  1. The Soviet origin of the strategy 
  In 1924, after Lenin died, the Soviets were left at the crossroads with two contradicting 
approaches from Lenin: a command economy (under War Communism) versus the market-
friendly ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP). This led to a four-year long debate among the Soviet 7 
elite who were divided in two rival camps: those who supported ‘balanced growth’ and those 
who favoured ‘unbalanced growth’.  
  Bukharin who seemed to understand economics was the leader of the ‘balanced growth’ 
camp. He emphasised, quite rightly, (1) the interdependence of industry and agriculture and 
the simultaneous growth between the two sectors; (2) the role of agricultural exports in 
obtaining advanced technology from the West; (3) the importance of peasant incentives, 
especially market incentives, to produce more and better; and (4) that Lenin’s NEP should 
continue. Bukharin sounded very much like President Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969) who proposed 
to ‘re-set the clock’ (yao tuigou) after the disastrous ‘Great Leap Forward’ and to revitalise 
agriculture under a new agrarian policy of ‘three economic freedoms and one production 
contract’ (sanzi yibao). 
  Preobrazhensky was the figurehead of the ‘unbalanced growth’ camp. The real leader was 
Trotsky who was more influential than Stalin at the time of the debate. Preobrazhensky 
argued that (1) heavy industry should be given the priority to grow; (2) agriculture must bear 
the main burden of capital accumulation; (3) ordinary people's consumption needed to be 
sacrificed; and (4) Lenin’s NEP should be abandoned. This sounds like Mao and his left-
wing comrades under the banner of so-called ‘four modernisations’ (sige xiandaihua).6
  Stalin seized this opportunity of divided opinions within the communist party for his 
personal bid to take over state power.7 Stalin’s choice fitted in well with his peasant/kulak 
paranoia and his hunger for paramount power.8 This piece of Soviet history reveals that 
unbalanced growth was not the sole choice available. Rather, it was a political decision to 
maximise Stalin’s personal power. 
                                                 
6 The ‘four modernisations’ referred to modernisation in four areas: industry, agriculture, defence, and science 
and technology. The slogan represented the pinnacle of Mao’s unbalanced growth attempts in the early 1970s. 
The deadline for the four modernisations was set for 1999. Given that there was no mentioning of how to 
improve ordinary people’s living standards, this was just another licence to extract resources from the public à 
la the Meiji state. 
7 Shrewdly, Stalin first supported Bukharin's ‘balanced growth proposal’ to destroy Preobrazhensky and 
Trotsky. Trotsky was forced into exile. Once this was done, Stalin wasted no time to frame Bukharin and sent 
him to his firing squad. After that, Stalin switched back to the ‘unbalanced growth approach’.  
8 After several years of New Economic Policy, 5–7 per cent of Soviet peasants became wealthy kulaki (Nove 
1992: 103); and Soviet agriculture recovered. This really means that the New Economic Policy provided the 
agricultural sector with the incentives to produce more and better and to invest more and wider. But, the honey-
moon between the communists and the kulaki was soon over. In 1930-1, the kulaki, about 1.5 million of them, 
the best farmers and most active agrarian entrepreneurs, were deported to marginal land in Siberia under 
Stalin’s order (Nove 1992: 166). 8 
  However, to be fair, there is a technical side to this choice. Although in principle, ‘total 
planning’ for the economy was aimed at by the Soviet planners, the actual number of 
products subject to planning was about 30,000 (Gregory and Stuart 1994: 152). To work out 
a general equilibrium in a ‘balanced growth’ fashion, the total number of equations needs to 
be solved is nine billion and take as many as 12,000 pages. Even with all the nine billion 
equations in place, the Soviet planners had a constant problem with plan fulfillment: from 
1932 to 1985, there was not a single period in which the Soviet plan was fully realised (Nove 
1992: 228; Gregory and Stuart 1994: 101, 135, 155). 
  The bottom line is that without market mechanisms, balanced growth under economic 
planning requires perfect knowledge, both quantitative and qualitative, of all aspects of 
economic life.9 If such perfect knowledge is unobtainable, the planners may ‘by-pass’ this by 
adopting the strategy of ‘unbalanced growth’. This will reduce the equations. And, blue-
collar workers, according to Lenin’s dream, may have their fingers on the planning. So, in 
reality unbalanced growth was the best the Soviet system could achieve.10  
  In addition, in accordance with Lenin’s vision of establishing communism within one 
country, ISI (short for ‘Import Substitution Strategy for Industrialisation’) is the only 
possibility on the menu. However, ISI is inevitably haunted by resource constraints, which 
forms the main obstacle to further growth. The Soviet solution was simply to squeeze the 
agricultural sector as much as possible to finance the industrial sector. More often than not, 
coercion was required to obtain scarce resources. But such coercion was ‘rationalised’ by 
Stalin’s ISI teleology. 
                                                 
9 In the West, the absence of perfect knowledge in the market and its impact have been carefully addressed, 
typically in the forms of the ‘asymmetrical problem’ (referring to different business entities) and the ‘principle–
agent problem’ (concerning the same business entity). Such discussion is politically incorrect under 
communism which in principle overrides any private, individual interest and thus assumes a common goal is 
shared among all the citizens at all times. 
10 Lenin’s formulae are unsophisticated: 
 
  (1) Output of capital goods > capital goods replacement + new investment. 
Hence, 
  (2) Output of capital goods > consumer goods. 
And, 
  (3) Investment in capital goods production > investment in consumer goods production. 
 
This is a licence for the Soviet planners to have a free hand to make a mess of the economy. And they did. 
 
 9 
  But from a sustainability point of view, the unbalanced growth approach with ISI is the 
worst possible combination for modern growth simply because (1) it is bound to distort 
resource allocation to make ISI artificially affordable in the short run and (2) distorted 
resource allocation will in turn slow ISI in the long run. This is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Different combinations of growth strategies and their ranking 
 

















          (–, –)
India, 1945–85 
         (–, +)
Post-WWII 
Hong Kong 
   Taiwan 
     (+, +)
Post–WWII 
South Korea 
     (+, –)
 
Note: ISI – ‘Import Substitution Strategy for Industrialisation’. EOI – ‘Export-oriented Strategy for 
Industrialisation’. Positive for sustainable growth (+). Negative for sustainable growth (–).  
  Before 1955, the main agenda for the Indian leadership was to achieve economic stability. 1955 marked 
a turning point when Professor Mahanalobis switched the goal of planning from economic stability to 
economic growth. However, overall India pursued balanced growth with ISI (Tomlinson 1993). The 
secret lies in the government liability to its electorate under democratic socialism. South Korea is 
notorious for its government manipulation of the price structure known as ‘to get the price wrong’ for a 
heavy-industry-led growth (Alam 1989; Wade 1990; Amsden 1992). Chinese family firms formed the 
growth engine in Hong Kong and Taiwan where state intervention was less compared with the USSR, 
Mao’s China, post-independence India and post-WWII South Korea (Rabushka 1979; Chou 1985; 
Rowen 1998: chs 2–3, 9 and 14). 
 
  2. Mao’s wholesale adoption of the Soviet system and growth doctrine 
  Mao’s wholesale adoption of the Soviet unbalanced growth with ISI doctrines became 
apparent in as early as 1956 (see Table 1).11 Moreover, Mao pushed it at break-neck speed 
and beat Stalin’s record (see Table 2). As the Stalinist institutions were growth pattern-
specific, this change in China planted the seed of unsustainability of Mao’s economy. 
                                                 
11 To be fair, the initial push for industrialisation was provided by Stalin’s Soviet Union. Thus, China did not 
have 100 per cent ISI from the start. Only after the first round when over 100 industrial projects were imported 
from the Soviet Union, China's industrialisation adopted the 'import-substitution' type as claimed by the party 
line of 'self-reliance'. 10 
 11 
Table 1. Unbalanced Growth Approach under Mao: Shares in Total Capital Investment, 1953–75 
 
 
  Period  Heavy industry (A)  Light industry (B)  A:B 
 
 
 1953–7  36%  7%  5.1 
 1958–62  54%*  7%  7.7 
 1963–5  46%  4%  11.5 
 1966–70  51%  4%  12.8 
 1971–5  50%  6%  8.3 
 Average  47%  6%  7.8 
 
Source: Based on Lan 2000: 110–11. 
Note: *Figure that was inflated under the Great Leap Forward regime with industrial inputs and outputs which 
had little utility or value.  
 
Table 2. Changes under Communism, China versus the USSR 
 
 
Time lag  Under Stalin (A)  Under Mao (B)  B–A 
 
 
State take-over to collectivisation  12 years (1917–29)  5 years (1949–54)  –7 years 
Process of rural collectivisation  9 years (1929–38)  1 year (1955–6)  –8 years 
State take-over to the first FYP  11 years (1917–28)  3 years (1949–52)  –8 years 
State take-over to industrial spurt   15 years (1917–32)  9 years (1949–58)  –6 years 
Average     –7.3  years 
 
 
Source: Based on Gregory and Stuart 1994; DNS 1998: 70–88. 
Note: FYP – Five-year plan. 
 
 
D. Economic structure and its change 
 
  In the late Qing, China’s urban-rural ratio was 0.20 (from 17:83). In the early 1920s, it 
improved to 0.27 (from 21:79) (Jiang 1994: 70). But, in 1958–78, the ratio was 0.19 (from 
16:84), worse than the Qing level (Cui 1997: 11). Thus, regardless of what was vigorously 
promoted during the Mao’s era, and regardless of the industrial growth in absolute volume, 
the evidence clearly indicates that the total structure of the Chinese economy changed very 
little.  
  Tables 3 and 4 show that until the very end of the Mao’s era, the Chinese economic 
structure was not fundamentally different from that of the Ming–Qing period was but very 
different from industrialising Russia and Japan. In other words, Mao’s China stayed within 
the range for a traditional economy in a developmental spectrum as China was structurally 
un-industrialised until 1978, staying roughly at the same level of Tsarist Russia (1914 in 12 
terms of employment pattern), Japan (1872 under Meiji in terms of employment pattern, or 
1920 in terms of GDP shares) and colonial India (1901 in terms of employment pattern, or 
1989 in terms of GDP shares). 
 
Table 3. China’s Economic Structure Seen in Employment Pattern, 1978 
 
  
  Total employment  Agriculture  Industry  Services   
 
 
Mao’s China   
 1978  100%  71%*  17%  12% 
 
Ming–Qing China  100%  80%  20% (including services) 
 
Russia/USSR  
  1914  100%  75%†  25% (including services) 
  1926  100%  86%  12% (including services) 
  1939  100%  54%  45% (including services) 
Japan  
  1872  100%  72%†  28% (including services) 
  1920  100%  54%  46% (including services) 
  1940  100%  42%  58% (including services) 
India  1901  100%  65%†  35% (including services) 
 
 
Source: Based on Li 1995; Zhang 1998; Charlesworth 1982: 20; Feuerwerker 1984: 299, 302, 312–13; Chao 
1986: ch. 3; Minami 1986: 24; Wheatcroft et al. 1986: 273; Maitra 1991: 101, 132; Francks 1992: 29; 
Davies et al. 1994: 112; Gregory 1994: 21, 42. 
Note: *Minimal proportion: some data suggest that in 1978 the total rural population was 803.2 million out of 
China’s 962.5 million which made the rural share 83 per cent of China’s total (Ling 1997: 102). †Rural 
population as a proxy. 
 
 
Table 4. China’s Economic Structure Seen in Shares in GDP, 1960 and 1978 versus 1994 and other countries 
 
  
Year   Total  Agriculture  Industry  Services   
 
 
China under Mao 
 1960 100%  27%*  60%†  13% 
 1978 100%  28%*  49%†  23% 
 
China after Mao 
 1994 100%  19% 49%  32% 
Japan 
 1920 100%  25% 19%  56% 
 1930 100%  21% 24%  55% 
 1965 100%  10% 44%  46% 
India 
 1965 100%  44% 22%  34% 
 1989 100%  30% 29%  41% 
 
 
Source: Based on Li 1995; Zhang 1998; People’s Republic of China Year Book, 1996/97: 397; China’s Statistic 
Year Book 1983: 24; Ray 1979: 17; Lal 1988: 126–7; Rothermund 1993: 177; Gregory 1994: 28, 30. 13 
Note: *Nominal value only, which should be considerably higher if the scissors pricing is taken into account.12 
†Nominal value only, which should be considerably lower if the scissors pricing is taken into account. 
 
  What is more worrying is that compared to 1960, China actually went backwards in its 
degree of industrialisation: the agricultural sector gained a mere 1.4 percentage point in the 
total GDP share while the industrial sector lost as much as a shocking 11.4 percentage point 
(see Table 4). If the worsened scissors pricing is taken into account, the degree of de-
industrialisation by 1978 may well have been greater than the nominal values shown in Table 
4. Surely, the services sector gained 10 per cent. But, considering that China was not 
industrialised, the gain by the services sector did not help China in achieving its designated 
goal of self-reliant industrialisation.  
  This becomes more obvious if Mao’s China is compared with inter-war Japan and post-
independence India where industrialisation went along with a decline in the agricultural 
share of the total GDP and a rise in the industrial share of the total GDP. Post-Mao China of 
the 1990s had a similar trend although the share of the industrial sector did not change from 
its 1978 position (see Table 4). This is confirmed again by a cross-group comparison 
between the developed and developing economies. Not until 1994, 16 years after Mao’s era, 
did China gradually move close to the developing countries’ average in terms of reducing the 
agricultural share in the total GDP (see Table 5). It is worth noting that the seemingly small 
share for the industrial sector among the developing countries is largely due to the common 




Table 5. Economic Structure in Comparison (in GDP shares) 
 
 
Country Primary  industry  Secondary industry  Tertiary industry 
 
 
China    1978  28.4%  48.6%  23.0% 
 1994  18.8%  48.5%  32.7% 
 
Developing countries’ average (1993)  17.0%  28.0%  55.0% 
Developed countries’ average (1993)  2.0%  26.0%  64.0% 
 
 
Source: Based on People’s Republic of China Year Book, 1996-97: 397; China’s Statistic Year Book 1983: 24. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Scissors pricing is the legacy of Mao’s economic policy. In the early 1990s, analysts suggested that to 
equalise the sectoral incomes between agriculture and non-agriculture the price level for grain had to be 
increased fivefold (Fan 1995: 39). Here, a conservative 50 per cent weight is used for the estimation. 14 
    In addition, in the industrial spurt of 1958–60, 40 million of the rural population were 
employed full time in industrial projects. Soon, in 1962, all the rural industrial projects were 
abandoned. In addition, 26 million urban people – workers with their families – were sent to 
the countryside (Song and Qiao 1998: 183; Li and Zhang 1999: 205). In 1966–76, another 20 
million urban residents – school and university graduates this time – were resettled in the 
countryside (Pan 1994: 13; Cui 1997: 11). These 20 million young people came from 100 
million urban families which occupied about 36 per cent of China’s total urban population 
(based on 29 per cent of the total of 962.5 million).13 The actual impact of this resettlement 
scheme was further ‘ruralisation’ in Mao’s China. But, as China’s rural production did not 
experience any revolutionary change after the ‘gain’ of urban human capital, this 
resettlement proved to be a complete waste of time and resources. 
  Therefore, in terms of upgrading the economic structure in the process of modernisation or 
industrialisation, China did not progress well either in comparison to its own past (Ming–
Qing) or in comparison to its neighbouring countries (Russia, Japan and India). In addition, 
in light of most cases of achieving modernity in the world since the eighteenth century, it has 
been the norm that economic development has been associated with changes in economic 
structure and ordinary people’s living standards. The obvious lack of such changes under 
Mao simply means that although the country had some growth, whether it also achieved 
‘development’ is highly questionable. 
 
E. Economic performance 
 
  1. Economy-wide growth 
 To get an accurate picture for China’s economy-wide growth, it is very important 
methodologically to obtain a growth rate of the real GDP by eliminating the effect of 
inflation. It is known that in 1950–78, China’s inflation indexes were 135.9 (measured by 
retail prices) and 144.7 (measured by urban consumer good prices) (Li 1997: 49–50), 
China’s long-term annual inflation rates during Mao’s era were thus between 1.82 per cent 
and 2.20 per cent, averaging 2.01 per cent. This can be used as the basis to work out China’s 
real growth rates (see Appendix). 
  It has been widely agreed that the first 17 years under Mao, which occupied two-thirds of 
Mao’s era, was the best period of continued economic growth. It has also been agreed that 
the ‘Great Leap Forward’ (1958–60) marked the pinnacle of the first wave of growth under 
Mao. The ‘Great Leap Forward’ thus served as a divider of two sub-periods: 1949–60 and 
1961–6. 
                                                 
13 It is worth noting that sending youngsters to rural regions was precedented in Nazi Germany. 15 
  In Table 6, comparisons are presented between nominal and real growth rates as well as 
between different sub-periods during the short period of 1949 to 1966 when the Maoist state 
was intentionally developmental.14 A pattern emerges from the comparison. The ‘Pre-
socialist Period’ (1949–55), which was also called ‘new democratic period’, had by far the 
highest growth rates (either nominal or real). The ‘Fast Growing Period’ (1949–60), which 
also had two digit or near-two digit growth rates, was a close second. The growth rates 
slowed down considerably after 1956, which marked the beginning of the ‘Socialist Period’ 
(1956–66). The slow-down was unmistakably associated with Maoist socialism and, in 
particular, his ‘Great Leap Forward’ that plunged the economy into crisis.15
 
Table 6. China’s GDP Annual Growth Rates (%), 1949–66 
 
  
Period breakdown  Nominal GDP {A}  Real GDP {B}  B–A 
 
 
A. Overall (1949–66)  9.2 (6.6)  5.9 (3.3)  –3.3 
 
B. Institution-oriented sub-division 
 
  (1) Pre-socialist period (1949–55)    14.0 (11.4)  11.5 (8.9)  –2.5 
  (2) Socialist period (1956–66)    6.1 (3.5)  2.3 (–0.3)  –3.8 
 
C. Growth-oriented sub-division 
 
  (3) Fast growing period (1949–60)  11.8 (9.2)  9.0 (6.4)  –2.8 




Source: Based on Tables i and ii in Appendix. 
Note: Figures in parentheses – net GDP growth by discounting population growth at a rate of 2.6 per cent per 
year during Mao’s era (He 1994: 7). 
 
  That is not all. If we take China’s population growth rate into account, the net growth rates 
look un-impressive. During the period 1952 to 1980, under state encouragement, China’s 
population doubled with an annual growth rate of 2.6 per cent (He 1994: 7).16 If this long-
term population growth rate is applied to the entire 1950 to 1978 period, much of the growth 
                                                 
14 It is another matter of whether the intention was materialised. 
15 The economic slowing down during 1956 to 1966 has been tackled by scholars (see for example Wang 1999: 
81). 
16 As usual, there is a debate on China’s population growth rate. But a consensus has been reached that the 
growth rate was over two per cent per annum during Mao’s era (see Jiang 1994: 70; Cui 1997: 10–11; see also 
ZJB 1999: 52, 109, 181, 189, 198, 206, 216, 223, 229, 234, 243, 252, 258, 265, 270). In 1963, the growth rate 
reached 3.3 per cent (ZJB 1999: 189). He’s estimate is most realistic as a rate of 2.6 per cent per annum allows 
a population to double its size in 28 years. This matched perfectly China’s demography under Mao (1949–78).  16 
was cancelled out. Indeed, the gross growth during 1956 to 1966 may have well been wiped 
out by China’s population expansion.  
  Thus, there is good reason to believe that after 1955, China’s economy was stagnant. Such 
stagnation is most visible in terms of per capita GDP growth (see Table 7).17 Such stagnation 
was highly compatible with the stagnation of China’s economic structure (see Tables 3, 4 
and 5). In comparison, Soviet growth was far more vigorous than Mao’s by 1970, even by 
the conservative estimation of the West (see Table 8). 
 
Table 7. Official Statistics, per capita GDP, 1956 and 1966 
 
 
  Year  GDP (current price)  Nominal index  GDP (1956 price)*  Real index 
 
 
  1956  U$ 109   U$ 109  100  100 
  1966  U$ 159  U$ 123  146   113 
 Annual  growth      3.9%  1.2% 
 
 
Source: Based on Wang 1999: 82. 
Note: *Conversion is based on the average inflation rate of 2.01% per year for the period of 1950 to 1978 (Li 
1997: 49–50). 
 
Table 8. Soviet Growth Performance (%, annual), 1951–85 
 
 
Period  Official figure (I)  Real value (II)*  II–I 
 
 
1951–60 10.3  5.1  –5.2 
1961–5 6.5  4.8  –1.7 
1966–70 7.8  5.0  –2.8 
1971–5 5.7  3.1  –2.6 
1976–80 4.3  2.2  –2.1 
1981–5 3.6  1.8  –1.8 
 
Soviet long-tern annual  6.4  3.7  –2.7 
Mao’s long-term annual†  6.1  2.3  –3.8 
 
 
Source: Based on Gregory and Stuart 1994: 236. 
Note: *Estimated by CIA. †‘Socialist period’: 1956–66. 
 
  Logically, (1) if industrial growth was given priority to grow, and (2) the whole economy 
was rather stagnant, there must have been a ‘zero-sum game’ amongst sectors within the 
national economy. This judgment is strongly supported by recent studies of Chinese 
agriculture itself (see Ling 1997; DNS 1998; Zhang 1998). Evidently, despite the fact that the 
                                                 
17 Table 6 shows the same calibre of China’s growth during the same period regardless of some nuances. 17 
agricultural sector remained the largest employer of the economy, food production and food 
supply were a constant problem (Table 9).  
 
Table 9. China’s Food Availability Seen from Food Export (in 10,000 tons) 
 
 
Year  South China  North China  China total 
 
 
A. Pre-socialist Period 
 1953  257.3  43.2  300.5 
 1954  165.9  106.5  272.4 
 1955  265.3  54.7  320.0 
 
B. Socialist period 
 1956*  345.1  –8.7  336.4 
 1957  426.4  –161.1  265.3 
 1958  432.5  –12.1  420.4 
 1959†  438.3  151.5  589.8 
 1960  308.3  –138.8  169.5 
 1961*  19.1  –428.5  –409.4 
 1962  26.2  –359.4  –333.2 
 1963  130.3  –428.1  –297.8 
 1964  230.8  –351.5  –120.7 
 1965  263.1  –446.1  –182.9 
 1966  201.0  –179.6  21.4 
 1967†  164.6  11.7  176.3 
 1968  197.5  –173.5  24.0 
 1969  187.0  –256.3  –69.3 
 1970  191.7  –198.7  –7.0 
 1971  239.0  –150.0  89.0 
 1972  181.5  –392.0  –210.5 
 1973  159.4  –390.1  –230.7 
 1974  227.5  –281.5  –54.0 
 1975†  145.1  54.7  199.8 
 1976  70.8  –125.5  –54.7 
 1977  11.5  –406.0  –394.5 
 1978*  –105.2  –574.9  –680.1 
 
 
Source: Based on DNS 1998: 251. 
Note: *Turning points in terms of food shortage. †Exceptional harvest. 
 
  Interestingly, 1956 and 1978 serve as two turning points. From 1956 onwards, North China 
suffered food shortages. From 1978, China as a whole faced the same problem after South 
China ceased to be a food surplus region. Thus, during the socialist period, it became the 
norm that somewhere in China food needed to be imported to feed the population, the 
exceptions being 1959, 1967 and 1975. Even worse, 1961 marked the beginning of China’s 
need for foreign supplies of food. Overall, China’s food availability declined under Mao: it 18 
did not match China’s Ming–Qing past,18 nor did it match contemporary post-independence 
India.19
 As food is a basic human need, the lack of it says a lot about the economy-wide 
performance under Mao.20  
 
  2. Low capital efficiency 
 Similar to the problem in the Soviet Union, Mao’s China had deteriorating capital 
efficiency. During the period of 1953 to 1980, China’s average return-to-investment ratio 
was 0.30 and its return-to-reinvestment ratio was only 0.18, a clear case of diminishing 
returns in capital investment (He 1994: 8).21 In other words, there was a great deal of over-
investment in Mao’s economy. Much of the over-investment was made in regions and sectors 
where the returns were minimal. In 1958–78, the aggregate state investment was 500 billion 
yuan of which 80 per cent (400 billion) was allocated in the ‘rear’ or ‘outback’ provinces 
(Cui 1997: 19). This was what can be called ‘pseudo-development’ with resources ruthlessly 
wasted.22
  Table 10 shows this pattern of ‘pseudo-development’: in the hinterland regions, the decline 
in capital efficiency was 1.3 times faster than its coastal counterpart but the speed of fixed 
capital investment in the hinterland increased twice as fast as than in the coastal regions. The 
acid test for this investment pattern comes from the fact that by 1978 the hinterland-biased 
investment did not change China’s regional growth differentiation: not only did the per 
capita income level of hinterland remain marginalised, but also the regional per capita 
income gap increased by 32.5 per cent (Hu et al. 1995: ch. 2, especially p. 54). Indeed, most 
                                                 
18 During the Ming–Qing Period, Chinese agriculture was able to produce comfortably 25 per cent food surplus 
most of the time to feed China’s 20 per cent population in the urban sector (Feuerwerker 1984: 299, 302, 312–
13). 
19 Since independence, India has never suffered from large-scale famine (Sen 1981; Nolan 1993). 
20 Deliberately I avoid using the large-scale of starvation immediately after Mao’s ‘Great Leap Forward’ which 
cost 30 million lives as the main evidence of Maoist deficiencies. My point is that even if the ‘Great Famine’ 
from 1960 to 1962 is ignored, Chinese agriculture still did not perform well by China’s own premodern 
standards. 
21 China’s low capital efficiency was clearly reflected by its poor energy input-to-output ratio. In the early 
1990s, China’s energy input-to-output ratio was twice that in the US and 6 times that in Japan (Zhang 1994: 
65). 
22 This sounds like a cliché but still true: quite the opposite to what Marx predicated, it is the inflexibility of the 
centrally planned command economy that has led to its demise in a developmental race with capitalism (see 
Harriss 1995: 22). 19 
hinterland regions are still regarded as poverty-stricken areas today (Zhou and Lu 1997; 
Zeng and Guan 1998). This simply means that the growth from the investment in hinterland 
did not trickle down to benefit the general public as it should have done. 
 
Table 10. Geographic Allocation of Capital Investment and Capital Efficiency 
 
 
  Year  Total fixed capital (billion yuan)  Total net product (billion yuan) 
 Coast  Hinterland  Coast  Hinterland 
 
 
A. Invested amount 
  1952  10.7 (100)  4.2 (100)  23.8 (100)  10.5 (100) 
  1978  140.0 (1,380)  179.3 (4269)  257.5 (1082)  165.6 (1577) 
 
 
   Year  Total net product/total fixed capital 
 Coast  Hinterland 
 
 
B. Capital efficiency 
  1952  2.2 (100)  2.5 (100) 
  1978  1.8 (82)  0.9 (36) 
 
 
Source: Based on Cui 1997: 19. 
 
  This legacy of ‘pointless investment’ (mangmu touzi) continued in the post-Mao period 
with multiple symptoms. First, until the early 1990s, of the total of 2,200 billion yuan of 
fixed capital, one-third was idle which was a waste for the economy. Second, only one-third 
of all the state-owned enterprises (presumably modernised to their teeth by Chinese 
standards) managed to break even or make some profit. The remaining two-thirds made 
losses and a great many such enterprises were virtually on the brink of bankruptcy (as at 
1995, see Pan 1995: 51). So, the ship of state-owned enterprises was sinking.23
  In addition, as aforementioned, the same proportion of population in rural China produced 
less and less food in relative terms. In 1953, China’s total grain output was 177 million 
metric tons; in 1978, the total grain output reached 300 million tons (Cui 1997: 10, 11, 15). 
But this was achieved by 3–4 times increased labour input with a doubled rural population 
(Xie 1999: 30). Here, conceptually, the agricultural sector must have suffered diminishing 
returns so bad that the marginal product of labour was almost certainly negative.24 More 
                                                 
23 There can be no doubt that in the state sector the ‘asymmetrical problem’ and the ‘principle–agent problem’ 
loomed large. The former took the form of unrealistic and inaccurate planning; and the latter, discord and non-
cooperation of enterprise managers with the ministries. Indeed, if these two problems could be solved under 
communism, capitalism would be replaced  everywhere by communism. 
24 A conservative estimate suggests a rate of –0.2 per cent per year during 1957 to 1978 (Zhao 2000: 99). 20 
seriously, Mao’s self-reliance proved to be a farce even in a sector where China had had a 
recognised comparative advantage from its archaic past (see Table 9).  
  By definition, low capital efficiency implies unsustainability in economic growth which 
shows clearly in China’s business cycles and crises. 
 
  3. Business cycle and economic crises 
  The data in Table 11 are for the ‘golden age’ of Soviet growth during the inter-war period 
(1919–40) while the worldwide economic recession hit hard in the West. It was during this 
period that an illusion occurred that the Soviet planned economy was an alternative system 
superior to the Western market economy. Even so, when one examines carefully the Soviet 
performance of this period, there was a five-year growth cycle, similar to the Western 
business cycle.25 In comparison, not only did Mao’s economy during its own golden age 
have a similar five-year cycle, it also had two-digit negative growth, unprecedented in Soviet 
history, not to mention the fact that the overall growth rate of Mao’s economy was slower 
than its Soviet counterpart (see Table 12). 
 
Table 11. Yearly Growth of National Income in the USSR, 1926–40 
 
 
  Year  % growth of previous period 
 
 
 1926  22.2 
 
Cycle I  1927  6.0 
 1928  8.7 
 1929  15.6 
 1930  21.1 
 1931  16.8 
 1932  11.2 
 
Cycle II  1933  6.6 
 1934  15.0 
 1935  19.6 
 1937  20.0 
 1940  10.0 
 
Long-term average    14.4 
 
 
Source: Based on Bandera 1984: 21. 
 
                                                 
25 Marx’s early prediction that the communist system can secure economic growth without a business cycle and 
economic crises has proven to be a fairy tale. 21 
Table 12. Yearly Growth of China’s Nominal, Real and Net Total GDP, 1949–66 (in billion yuan) 
 
  
  Year  Nominal  % growth of previous period  Real*  % growth of previous period    
 
 
Cycle I  1949  35.8  –  35.8  –   
  1950  42.6 19.0 41.7  16.5 
  1951  49.7 16.7 47.7  14.4 
  1952  58.9 18.5 55.3  15.9 
  1953  70.9 20.4 65.0  17.5 
 
Cycle II  1954  74.8  5.5  67.0  3.1 
 1955  78.8  5.3  68.8  2.7 
  1956  88.2 11.9 75.0  9.0 
 1957  90.8  2.9  75.1  0.1 
  1958  111.8† 23.1† 89.9†  19.7† 
 1959  122.2†  9.3†  95.3†  6.0† 
 
Cycle III  1960  122.0  –0.2 92.1  –3.4 
 1961  99.6  –18.4 72.7  –21.1 
 1962  92.4  –7.2 65.1  –10.5 
 1963  100.0  8.2  67.9  4.3 
  1964  116.6 16.6 76.0  11.9 
  1965  138.7 19.0 86.7  14.1 
  1966  158.6 14.3 94.8  9.3 
 
Cycle IV  1967–76§ 
 
Gross average     9.7    6.4 
Net average¶     7.1   3.8 
 
 
Source: Based on China’s Statistic Year Book 1983: 13–14, 22–3. 
Note: *Conversion is based on the average inflation rate of 2.01% per year for the period of 1950 to 1978 (Li 
1997: 49–50). †Figures that were inflated under the Great Leap Forward regime with industrial inputs and 
outputs which had little utility or value and agricultural outputs which were boasted out of proportion. 
Thus, the maximum of a one-digit growth was more realistic. §Period known as the Cultural Revolution 
when real growth came to a complete halt due to nation-wide anarchy. ¶Net value by discounting 
population growth at a rate of 2.6 per cent per year during Mao’s era (He 1994: 7). 
 
  Evidently, Table 13 shows that the period between 1958 and 1960 was marked as a period 
of severe economic crisis: China suffered an all-rounded economic landslide. Most worrying 
of all was that the total collapse of capital returns which virtually dropped to zero. This is 
reflected by data in Table 12 where China had negative growth for three years. With it, there 
was a process of de-urbanisation and de-industrialisation: by 1962, as mentioned earlier, 26 
million urban residents were mobilised to resettle in rural regions (Song and Qiao 1998: 183; 
Li and Zhang 1999: 205). It was not surprising that China also had severe inflation after the 
Great Leap Forward: in 1960, the total volume of cash in circulation was increased to 9,590 
million yuan, an increase of 28 per cent from that of the previous year (Li and Zhang 1999: 
190). 
 22 
Table 13. Official Statistics for the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, 1960–2 
 
 
 1958  1960  1962 
Agriculture nominal (billion yuan)  56.6 (100)*  45.7 (81)  – 
Agriculture real (billion yuan)  56.6 (100)  43.8 (78)  – 
Light industry nominal (billion yuan)  61.6 (100)  43.4 (70)  – 
Light industry real (billion yuan)  61.6 (100)  41.6 (67)  – 
Capital investment nominal (billion yuan)  –  31.2 (100)  6.0 (19) 
Capital investment real (billion yuan)  –  31.2 (100)  5.8 (18) 
Budget deficit (billion yuan)  6.6† (100)  8.2 (124)†  ±5 (78)† 
 
Iron and steel (10,000 tons)  –  1,886 (100)  600 (32) 
Investment projects  –  1,800 (100)  1,000 (56) 
State-owned enterprises  –  96,000 (100)  52,300 (54) 
 
Capital returns (%)  100  0.73 (0.7)  – 
Labour Productivity (%)  100  62 (60)  – 
 
 
Source: Based on Lu 1999: 44; Li and Zhang 1999: 188, 201. 
Note: GDP figures in parentheses – real GDP at the 1958 constant price by discounting an annual inflation rate 
of 2.01% (Li 1997: 49–50). But, in reality, there was a price surge in 1960 for consumer goods (Song and 
Qiao 1998: 168; Li and Zhang 1999: 190). Thus, this average rate of 2.01% should be taken as the 
minimum. Index figures in parentheses – real GDP index unless indicated. *Figures that were inflated 
under the Great Leap Forward regime with agricultural outputs being boasted out of proportion. †1959 
figure. †Current price. 
 
  Table 14 reveals the outcome of the crisis in terms of goods production and consumption.  
 
Table 14. Decline of Consumers’ Goods in 1960 (1959=100) 
 
 
  Grain Sugar  Cotton  Oil Egg  Poultry  Pig  Meat 
 
 
A. Government procurement  66  36  77  58  –  –  69  – 
B. Retail sales  –  –  –  –  70  49  –  71 
C.  Consumption  81  –  41*  – – – –  30† 
  
 
Source: Based on Song and Qiao 1998: 174; Li and Zhang 1999: 189–90. 
Note: By 1979 the state controlled 100% of the pricing of all industrial goods, 97.8% of the pricing of all the 
goods marketed (Chen et al. 1999: 33). Thus, the decline had little to do with price fluctuations. *Cotton 
cloth as a proxy. †Pork as a proxy. 
 
  The economic crisis after 1960 proved that Mao’s romanticised ‘Great Leap Forward’ was 
nothing but a great step backward in economic performance. But the Great Leap Forward 
was only one of the three crises during Mao’s era. There were two more to be accounted for. 
Earlier, there was a slightly minor crisis associated with rural collectivisation. Later, there 
was the notorious Cultural Revolution. 
  From 1955 to 1957 agricultural production and rural income had significant setbacks. 
Table 15 demonstrates how agricultural yields dropped according to a nation-wide survey. 23 
This simply reflected a decline in total factor productivity after the rural collectivisation. The 
reduced numbers of large animals means a loss of capital. This crisis was then translated into 
a nation-wide decline of rural household income (see Table 16). Ironically, those who were 
surveyed were considered the die-hard supporting groups of Mao’s revolution after 1927. 
The ultimate cause of the 1955–7 crisis has been commonly identified as an institutional 
shock which reduced peasants’ confidence in the security of their property rights and 
therefore reduced their incentives to work hard and invest more (see for example, Ling 1997; 
Zhang 1998). Later, Mao’s frequent political purges led to a much bigger economic disaster 
in the decade between 1966 and 1976. The damage caused by his Cultural Revolution must 
have been many times greater than the two-year long Great Leap frenzy.26 Judging from the 
                                                 
26 Among other things, the Cultural Revolution created ample opportunities for large number of ‘working class’ 
members (factory workers, commune farmers and army soldiers) to drop from productive forces and become 
sinecurists as the ultimate reward for being Mao’s loyalists: officials without any qualification and usually 
completely incompetent (called tigan, literally ‘upgrading to the official rank’). On the other hand, intellectuals 
and professionals – managers, administrators, journalists, lawyers, doctors, teachers, technicians and scientists 
were forced to leave their professions for years to take up hard labour to be de-intellectualised and de-
professionalised (called laogai, literally ‘re-moulding through labour’; he gongnong dacheng yipian, meaning 
‘completely identified with manual workers and peasants’). Even the potential intellectuals and professionals 
were not spared. School and university graduates were sent to countryside for re-education in order to be de-
intellectualised and de-professionalised (called zhishi qingnian shangshan xiaxiang, literally ‘youth settlement 
in mountains and villages’). This deliberate policy of replacing intellectuals and professionals in a centrally 
command economy with people with minimum education and no qualification inevitably resulted in a sharp 
decline in quality of China’s human capital and a wide range of sate failure and economic disaster, not to 
mention the widespread regional civil war for state power (called duoquan, literally ‘seize power by force’), 
political violence (known as wudou, literally ‘armed fighting’), unlawful killing and unlawful imprisonment 
from 1966 to 1970 which led to nationwide marshal law (called junguan, literally ‘army direct control’ imposed 
on government departments, factories and other urban enterprises; junxun, literally ‘army supervision’ applied 
to schools and universities; and quanmin jiebing, meaning ‘everybody is under the military regime’) and hence 
ushered in the rise of Mao’s most trusted successor Marshal Lin Biao (till 1973) and a high degree of cronyism 
at the top, just to mention Mao’s wife Jian Qing and his nephew Mao Yuanxin. To a great extent, the Great 
Cultural Revolution was in effect a Great Cronyist Revitalisation. From economic development point of view, 
though, such policy and practise of anti-specialisation (in terms of downgrading intellectuals and professionals) 
and anti-diversification (regarding upgrading manual workers) were utterly irrational.  24 
crises during Mao’s era, conditions for growth and development deteriorated as the intervals 
between crises became shorter and crises lasted longer.27
 
Table 15. Fluctuations of Agricultural Yields, 1955 versus 1957 
 
 
Year Wheat  Soya  Oil-seed  Sugar  cane Beet  Tobacco  Large  animals 
 kg/mu  kg/mu  kg/mu  kg/mu  kg/mu  kg/mu  (10,000) 
 
 
1955 57.5  53.0 47.0  2,647  926.5  79.0 8,775 
1957 57.0  52.5 40.5  2,599  628.0  48.0 8,323   
Increase –0.5  –0.5  –6.5  –48  –298.5  –31  –452 
 
Source: Based on DNS 1998: 88. 
 
Table 16. Rural Income Decline at 1959 
 
 
  Number of households surveyed  % of households with income loss 
 
 
  Total households surveyed  195,354  28.9 
 
 Poor  households  65,394  26.5 
  Lower middle households (I)  39,184  23.0 
  Lower middle households (II)  25,333  31.1 
  Upper middle households (I)  17,268  28.0 
  Upper middle households (II)  23,542  33.2 
 Sub-total  170,721  28.4 
 
 
Source: Based on Su 1976: 151. 
 
  This echoed what happened in Stalin’s Soviet Union. Collectivisation sent such a strong 
shock wave through the agricultural sector that by 1933 Russia’s grain output dropped 30 per 
cent, the number of cattle 44 per cent, pigs 55 per cent, sheep and goats 65 per cent, horses 
50 per cent. The losses in livestock represented a heavy loss of capital. This was coupled 
with a large-scale famine in 1932–3. It is commonly agreed that as many as four million died 
                                                 
27 To indicate this point, in all there were five such intervals between major drives: five years between the 
Movement against Three and Five Evils (1951–2) and Anti-Rightist Struggle (1957), one year between Anti-
Rightist Struggle and the Great Leap Forward (1958–60), two years between the Great Leap Forward and the 
Rectification of Communes (zhengshe, 1962), three years between the Consolidation of People’s Communes 
and the Socialist Educational Drive (shejiao, 1964–5), and one year between the Socialist Educational Drive 
and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). 25 
of starvation (Nove 1992: 165–6). The difference between Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China 
was only a matter of degree. 
 
  2. Sectoral growth: industry and agriculture 
  The Soviet unbalanced growth type with ISI necessitates exploitation of the agricultural 
sector for labour supply, capital accumulation and capital formation. Thus, it is rational to 
nurture the agricultural sector for the ‘golden eggs’. To achieve this, it is equally rational to 
secure sustained growth in the agricultural sector at all times.  
  However, as shown in Table 17, real agricultural growth in terms of total output volume 
was as little as 0.6 per cent a year. It is under these circumstances that China changed from a 
net grain exporting economy to a net food importing economy (see Table 9). The situation 
changed only after Mao when the agricultural sector was given the opportunity to catch up 
with its industrial counterpart. A lower growth rate of industry (down to 7.9 per cent a year), 
and a higher growth rate of agriculture (up to 7.9 per cent a year) gave the economy more 
balance after 1978. Undoubtedly, during Mao’s era, the distortion was deliberate and worse 
that Stalin’s USSR (see Table 17). 
 
Table 17. China’s Output Growth (1952–83) Compared to the USSR (1928–32) 
 
 
  Gross increase  Net increase*  Gross increase 
 
 
China  Mao’s era  Mao’s era  Post-Mao 
  1952–78 (% annual)  1952–78 (% annual)  1978–83 (% annual) 
Industry (A)  11.2  8.6  7.9 
Agriculture (B)  3.2 (2.7†)  0.6 (0.1§)  7.9 




  Stalin’s super-industrialisation  
USSR  1928–32 (% annual) 
Industry (A)  12.5¶ 




Source: Based on Lippit 1987: 107; Ellman 1975: 845; cf. China’s Statistic Year Book 1985: 239; He 1994: 7–
8. 
Note: *Net growth rate by discounting population growth at a rate of 2.6 per cent per year during Mao’s era 
(He 1994: 7). †China’s own statistics (China’s Statistic Year Book 1985: 239). §Derived from China’s 
own statistics (China’s Statistic Year Book 1985: 239). ¶GDP growth as a proxy. 
 
 
  Most strikingly, from Table 17, the net growth rate of the industrial sector was at least 13 
times higher than that of the agricultural sector. This echoes Stalin’s ‘super-industrialisation’ 
or ‘industrial dictatorship’ some four decades earlier during the inter-war years in the Soviet 26 




Table 18. China’s Industrial Structure (% in Sectoral GDP), 1978 versus 1995, Compared to the USSR 
 
 




  1978  57% (100)  43% (100) 
  1995  50% (88)  50% (116) 
 
USSR 
  1932  47% (100)*  53% (100)† 
  1937  58% (123)*  42% (79)† 
 
 
Source: Based on Li 1998: 54; Nove 1992: 228. 
Note: *Capital goods output as a proxy. †Consumers goods output as a proxy. 
 
 
  Back to agriculture itself, Table 19 portrays an even more gloomy picture considering the 
value of agricultural output: if both inflation and population growth are taken into account, 
the growth was largely negative (Indices II and IV).28
 
 
Table 19. Agricultural Output and GDP Performance, 1952–77 
 
 
  Year  Gross output (billion yuan) Nominal  GDP  Index  Real GDP*  Index 
    (Current price)  Index (I)  (1952 price)*  Index (II)  (Billion yuan)       (III)        (Billion yuan)      (IV) 
 
 
  1952  41.7  100  41.7 100  34.0 100  34.0  100 
  1957  53.7  129  48.1 115  42.5 125  38.1  112 
  1962 –  –  – –  44.4  131  34.6  102 
  1965  59.0  141  41.6  100 –  – –  – 
  1967 –  –  – –  70.3  208  45.8  135 
  1972  70.4  169  36.0  86 83.0  244 42.4  125 
  1977  80.7  194  28.7  69 98.1  289 34.9  103 
 
Gross  annual    2.7%    –1.5%   4.3%   0.1% 
Net annual†   0.1%    –4.1%   1.7%   –2.5% 
 
 
Source: Based on China’s Statistic Year Book 1985: 239; cf. ZJB 1999: 24, 40, 51, 64–5, 76–7, 99–100, 108–9, 
128, 141, 155, 222–3, 257–8, 291–2. 
Note: *Conversion is based on the average inflation rate of 2.01% per year for the period of 1950 to 1978 (Li 
1997: 49–50). †Net growth by discounting population growth at a rate of 2.6 per cent per year during 
Mao’s era (He 1994: 7). 
                                                 
28 Not to mention under Mao the sudden, man-made decline of 56.5 million metric tons in food output (1959–
61) which cost over 30 million rural lives. 27 
 
  Table 20 illustrates a sectoral comparative perspective: during the Great Leap Forward, 
agricultural output declined (back to the level of the previous decade in terms of value).  
 
Table 20. Sectoral growth and decline during the fast growing period (in billion yuan, current price) 
 
  Total GDP   Industrial gross output   Agricultural gross output 
 
 
1949  46.6 (45)  14.0 (22)  32.6 (53) 
1950  57.6 (56)  19.1 (30)  38.4 (63) 
1951  68.4 (67)  26.4 (41)  42.0 (69) 
1952  67.9 (66)  34.9 (54)  48.4 (79) 
1953  82.4 (80)  45.0 (70)  51.0 (84) 
1954  85.9 (84)  51.5 (80)  53.5 (88) 
1955  91.0 (89)  53.4 (83)  57.5 (94) 
1956  102.8 (100)  64.2 (100)  61.0 (100) 
1957  106.6 (104)  70.4 (110)  53.7 (88) 
1958  130.7 (127)†  108.3 (169)†  56.6 (93)† 
1959  143.9 (140)†  148.3 (231)†  49.7 (81)† 
1960  145.7 (142)  163.7 (255)  45.7 (75) 
 
 
Source: Based on ZJB 1999: 24, 40, 51, 64–5, 76–7, 99–100, 108–9, 128, 141, 155; cf. China’s Statistic Year 
Book 1985: 239. 
Note: †Figures that were inflated under the Great Leap Forward regime with industrial inputs and outputs 
which had little utility or value and agricultural outputs which were boasted out of proportion.  
 
  Although China’s agriculture was crippled, pressure from the ISI policy kept mounting as 
more and more materials were demanded from agriculture to support industrial growth (see 
Table 21). 
 
Table 21. Agricultural Products for the Non-Agricultural Sector, 1962–78 (in billion yuan) 
 
 
  Year  Total nominal value   Index  Total real value  Index 
    (Current price)  (1962 price)* 
 
 
  1962  21.1 100  21.1 100 
 1978  55.8    264  34.9  165 
 Annual  growth    6.3%    3.2% 
 
 
Source: Based on Lu 1999: 46. 
Note: *Conversion is based on the average inflation rate of 2.01% per year for the period of 1950 to 1978 (Li 
1997: 49–50). 
 
F. Material life of the people 
 
  1. Forced savings to finance ISI 28 
  a. Scissors pricing 
  One of the Soviet methods to soften the financial constraint closely associated with ISI was 
to distort the terms of trade systematically between the industrial and agricultural sectors, 
known as ‘scissors pricing’ which can be traced back to 1922–3 (Gregory and Stuart 1994: 
62–5).29  Under Stalin’s reign, this temporary tactic under the NEP became a permanent 
measure in 1929–53 (ibid: 90). The gap between the two sets of prices was the profit made 
by the Soviet state for capital accumulation. Thus, in nature, scissors pricing is a form of 
forced saving scheme through what can be better defined as ‘economy-wide arbitrage by the 
state’. Such a policy was copied from the very beginning of Mao’s era and remained 
unchanged until its end (see Table 22).  
 
Table 22. China’s price indices, 1950–6 
 
 
  Year  Industrial goods price index  Agricultural goods price index  Profit index 
 
 
 1950  100  100  0  (0) 
 1951  108  93  15  (100) 
 1952  110  90  20  (133) 
 1953  120  80  40  (267) 
 1954  123  78  45  (300) 
 1955  120  80  40  (267) 
 1956  125  77  48  (320) 
 Average  115  85  30 
 
 
Source: Based on National Price Commission 1964: 21. 
 
  This government arbitrage was the fundamental reason (1) why the agricultural sector 
produced as little as some 28 per cent of China’s total GDP while employing as much as 71 
per cent of China’s total labour force, and (2) why the industrial sector was able to ‘generate’ 
some 49 per cent of the total GDP while employing only 17 per cent of the total labour force 
(as at 1978, see Tables 3 and 4). So, after the distortion of terms of trade, the per capita GDP 
                                                 
29 The original idea was to attract more grain sale from the peasantry with the assumption that peasants would 
have the propensity to maintain their consumption pattern and hence their standard of living even if they have 
to pay higher prices for the same industrial goods and services. However, the Russian peasantry did not 
swallow the bait. The sale of grain remained at 50–57 per cent of the WWI level despite the fact that grain 
output recovered to the level close to the eve of WWI (Gregory and Stuart 1994: 65). A food shortage crisis 
soon re-occurred. 29 
in agriculture was 61 per cent below the economy-wide unity ratio while that in industry was 
188 per cent above the economy-wide unity ratio.30
  By comparison, the Qing economy had a better balance. The agricultural sector during the 
Qing provided the Chinese with 80 per cent of the total employment and produced around 70 
per cent of the total GDP (grain production alone occupying 60 per cent of the GDP) (Wang 
1973: 80; Feuerwerker 1984: 299, 302, 312–13). This means that the per capita GDP in 
agriculture was only 12.5 (in terms of agricultural total output) to 25 per cent (in terms of 
food production) below the economy-wide unity ratio. The non-agricultural sector with a 
total employment of 20 per cent of population was able to produce 30 per cent of the total 
GDP, a rate of return 50 per cent above the economy-wide unity ratio. Thus, under Mao the 
sectoral differentiation in the per capita GDP capacities between the agricultural and 
industrial sectors was about four times worse than the situation during the Qing.  
  The whole purpose of this government arbitrage was to impose forced savings on the 
agricultural sector. If one takes the Qing price structure as the norm, after state intervention 
under Mao the state was able to take away each year in excess of 36 to 49 per cent of 
agricultural GDP (61 per cent minus 25 per cent, and 61 per cent minus 12.5 per cent) via 
unequal exchange for industrial goods and services which had a hyper 138 per cent of price 
mark-up (188 per cent minus 50 per cent).  
  From the 1978 data, the impact of the scissors pricing was far greater than that of 
agricultural taxes (at a rate of 10–12 per cent of the total agricultural output) during the 
1950s) (Chen 2001: 14) which made up only 2.8–3.4 per cent of China’s total GDP.31 Given 
that 2.8–3.4 per cent of China’s total GDP equalled 10–12 per cent of China’s agricultural 
output, the drained 36 to 49 per cent of agricultural GDP from scissors pricing is thus 10–14 
per cent of China’s total GDP. Together with taxes, the state would take away as much as 
39–52 per cent of total agricultural output, an equivalent of 11–15 per cent of China’s total 
GDP. Mao’s state was not only far more efficient than China’s past imperial state in 
syphoning revenues from the economy, it also broke the record of rent-seeking Tsarist 
Russia, colonial India and Meiji Japan.32
                                                 
30 This 61 per cent mark should be taken as the minimum, as data suggest that the rural population in 1978 was 
as high as 83 per cent of China’s total (Ling 1997: 102). If so, the per capita GDP in agriculture was 66 per cent 
below the economy-wide unity ratio. 
31 The rate was likely to be higher: the rate set up in 1958 was 15.5 per cent of the total output (Cui 1997: 13). 
32 China’s old tax norm was around 10 per cent of the total output (Deng 1999b: app. G; Feuerwerker 1984: 
299–300). A Comparison of rural taxes in Russia, India and Japan (Gatrell 1986: 199, 200; Francks 1992: 30–
1; Rothermund 1993: 83–4): 
Country  Period  Type  Tax rate (% of total output) 30 
  The aggregate revenue from the agricultural taxes in 1958–78 totalled 341 billion yuan (Lu 
1999: 46). During the same period, the profit from grain monopsony and monopoly alone 
(made from the price difference between purchase and sale) amounted over 600 billion yuan. 
(Cui 1997: 13, 19). These two sums added a total of a staggering 941 billion yuan to the state 
coffers. Of this 600 billion yuan profit, half (300 billion yuan) was made directly from the 
lower price of grain purchased by the state (Cui 1997: 13, 19). If this 300 billion yuan is 
taken as the result of an indirect tax from the agricultural sector, the total revenue from 
agriculture was 641 billion yuan, more than enough to cover the total investment by Mao’s 
state of 500 billion yuan for the same period. 
  This means that the agricultural sector handed over to Mao’s state on average 32.1 billion 
yuan (counting direct and indirect taxes on agriculture) or 47.1 billion yuan (counting taxes 
on and profiteering from agriculture) each year. Against this background, the total asset of 
the agricultural sector (excluding land) was only 15 billion yuan (as at 1978, see Guo 1998: 
54). So the ‘golden egg’ from the agricultural sector was over two to three times of the value 
of the ‘hen’ itself. 
  The hangover of scissors pricing can be felt after Mao. Recent observations show (1) that 
judged by world market prices, till the end of the 1980s, the average income of the Chinese 
peasantry was 45 per cent lower than it deserved (Chen and Han 1995: 14–15), (2) that the 
grain price in China had to increase five times even during the 1990s in order to correct the 
inter-sectoral price distortion under the Maoist scissors pricing policy (Fan 1995: 39), and (3) 
that the ridiculously inflated value of industrial assets under the scissors pricing regime faced 
severe depreciation in the post-Mao marketisation: it has been estimated that in 1982–92, a 
total of 500 billion yuan worth of state-owned industrial assets was ‘lost’ in the process of 
marketisation (Zhang et al. 1996: 132). This was equivalent to the total capital investment 
during the whole of Mao’s era. 
  Much of the loss was claimed to be the result of ‘selling short’ in joint venture deals with 
foreign firms (Zhang et al. 1996: 142–3). Apart from official embezzlement (CCTV 2000; 
Chen 2000), the whole issue stems from either Maoist nostalgia or economic ignorance (or 
both). Indeed, all Chinese economists have accepted that there is an international market 
price for commodities. But, not all of them have accepted that there is also an international 
market price for production factors, especially capital goods. Even less have agreed that all 
of China’s industrial assets are inevitably subject to a ‘re-pricing’ process if China wants to 
have a full membership in the trading world. The alleged heavy loss of China’s state-owned 
                                                                                                                                                       
Japan Meiji  Land  30–50 
India 1920s  Land  6–22 
Russia 1901  Rural  inclusive  15–18 
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assets is a necessary process to remove the compounded impact of government distortion for 
decades in the form of artificial price mark-up for the industrial sector. From the market 
economy viewpoint, such ‘loss’, no matter how heavy it sounds, is well deserved. Judging 
from this angle, the state-owned sector under Mao was in nature a false or bubble economy 
which depended heavily on scissors pricing. 
  China’s ‘scissors price’ structure distorted the market price and artificially increased 
production costs in farming and at the same time cut back the returns from investment in 
agriculture. As a result, the incentives for investment were removed. In as late as the early 
1990s, even after several waves of price lifting, total investment in farming was only 0.37–
1.18 per cent of China’s total (Fan 1995: 40). It was also rational for individual farmers not 
to work hard despite the vigorous campaigns by the Maoist state to persuade the masses to 
follow the ideology of ‘devoting arduous efforts’ to socialism (Zhang 1998: pt 3). With such 
inferior conditions, it was logical for the agricultural sector to experience a prolonged 
recession during Mao’s era. It is agreed that the agricultural recession in turn dragged Mao’s 
industrial growth to the point of collapse (numerous works, eg. Cui 1997; Xie 1999). 
  But, on the other hand, monopolistic profit was yielded through scissors pricing. From 
1958 to 1978, the profit from grain monopsony and monopoly alone (made from the price 
difference between purchase and sale) amounted to over 600 billion yuan, more than the total 
capital investment by the state of the same period (500 billion yuan) (Cui 1997: 13, 19).  
  Together with the early discussion associated with Tables 15 to 22 and, especially, with the 
fact that the total revenue from agriculture was 641 billion yuan, more than enough to cover 
the total investment by Mao’s state of 500 billion yuan for the period of 1958 to 1978, it is so 
obvious that (1) heavy industry became the net investment recipient in the industrial sector, 
(2) the industrial sector as a whole became the net investment recipient in the entire economy 
and (3) the agricultural sector served as the net investment donor in the economy to support 
Mao’s industrial scheme. Given that China’s agricultural sector at best-experienced 
stagnation, under ISI any industrial growth in Mao’s China was most likely to be a result of a 
‘zero-sum’ game rather than a Pareto optimum. 
 
  b. Frozen wages 
  To take away 36 to 49 per cent of per capita GDP from the agricultural sector in order to 
mark up 138 per cent of prices for industrial goods did not however mean that urban workers 
were much better off. Forced savings also took the form of frozen wages from 1957 onwards. 
Even worse, what was frozen was only the nominal wage. With inflation, the real wage 
eroded badly: by 1978, the real average wage in the industrial sector was virtually halved 
from its 1957 level (see Table 23). The deteriorating real wage is positively confirmed by the 
real income level seen from dependant-supporting capacity per wageworker during the same 32 
period (see Table 24). This basically means that as in the USSR during the 1930s industrial 
growth and the price mark-up for industrial output did not benefit the urban working class. 
 
Table 23. Frozen Wage in the State Sector, 1957–78 
 
 
  Year  Nominal wage rate (monthly)  Index  Real wage rate (1957 price)*  Index 
 
 
 1957  637  100  637  100 
 1961  537  71    493  77   
 1965  652  93  539  85 
 1970  609  88    429  67 
 1976  605  86    327  51 
 1978  644  88  310  49 
 
 
Source: Based on Lippit 1987: 150; cf. Zhao 2000: 100. 
Note: *Conversion is based on the average inflation rate of 2.01% per year for the period of 1950 to 1978 (Li 
1997: 49–50). 
 
Table 24. Average Income Measured by Dependant-Supporting Capacity per Wage Worker 
 
 
  Year  Average family (persons)  Dependents (persons) 
 
 
 Pre-1949  –  4.0   
 1957  4.47    3.3 
 1964  5.80  3.4 
 1970  –  2.5 
 1977  4.49  2.1 
  
 
Source: Based on Cui 1997: 17–18. 
 
 
  To compensate for the decline in real wages, Mao’s economic planners followed closely 
Stalin’s model of ‘total employment’ (Gregory and Stuart 1994: 273): more and more 
workers were employed for a minimal wage (see Table 25). China’s industrial labour and 
total factor productivities suffered in a vicious circle of constant decline. This policy created 
an enormous problem for the industrial sector known as the ‘surplus labourers’ in the state-
owned sector. The total number of surplus workers counted for 30 to 37 million of the total 
out of 100 million employees of the sector (as at the mid-1990s, see Gu 1998: 61; Niu 1998: 
56). Rural China was no better. In the early 1980’s, surplus labourers in the rural sector 
reached 300 million. This was about one-third of China’s total rural population (Xia and Zhu 
1996: 48). Surplus labourers were a symptom of unsustainability of economic growth. 
 
Table 25. Mao’s ‘Total Employment’ in the Urban Sector, 1957–77 
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  Year  Average family size  Employed number   
      (Persons)  Index  (Persons/household)  Index 
 
 
  1957  4.47 100  1.05 100 
  1962  5.31 119  1.56 149 
  1964  5.80 130  1.61 153 
  1965  5.34 119  1.70 162 
  1977  4.49 100  2.07 197 
  Annual  growth   0%   3.4% 
 
 
Source: Based on Cui 1997: 17–18. 
 
  Jointly with scissors pricing and wage freezing, Mao’s state was able to accumulate capital 
at a very high rate as demonstrated in Table 26, where it is the norm for the rate for capital 
accumulation to surpass that for consumption. Forced saving was arguably the engine for 
growth under Mao. At this point it is worth noting that the tax burden on the industrial sector 
was extremely high at an average rate of 86 per cent (as at 1980) (Yang 1995: 44). This was 
determined by Mao’s state-owned enterprise structure. But, this effectively removed 
incentives to produce more and better at the micro level. 
 
Table 26. Capital Accumulation Rate versus Consumption Rate 
 
 
  Year  Accumulation Rate  Index (I)  Consumption Rate  Index (II)  I:II 
 
 
A. Fast growing period 
 1952  21.4  100  78.6  100  1.0 
 1953  23.1  108  76.9  98  1.1 
 1954  25.5  119  74.5  86  1.4 
 1955  22.9  107  77.1  98  1.1 
 1956  24.4  114  75.6  96  1.2 
 1957  24.9  116  75.1  96  1.2 
 1958  33.9  158  66.1  84  1.9 
 1959  43.8  205  56.2  72  2.8 
 1960  39.6  185  60.4  77  2.4 
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(Table 26, continued)  
 
 
  Year  Accumulation Rate  Index (I)  Consumption Rate  Index (II)  I:II 
 
 
B. Slow-down period 
 1961  19.2  90  80.8  103  0.9 
 1962  10.4  49  89.6  113  0.4 
 1963  17.5  82  82.5  105  0.8 
 1964  22.2  104  77.8  99  1.1 
 1965  27.1  127  72.9  93  1.4 
 1966  30.6  143  69.4  88  1.6 
 1967  21.3  99  78.7  100  1.0 
 1968  21.1  98  78.9  100  1.0 
 1969  23.2  108  76.8  98  1.1 
 1970  32.9  154  67.1  85  1.8 
 1971  34.1  160  65.9  84  1.9 
 1972  31.6  148  68.4  87  1.7 
 1973  32.9  154  67.1  85  1.8 
 1974  32.3  151  67.7  86  1.8 
 1975  33.9  158  66.1  84  1.9 
 1976  30.9  144  69.1  88  1.6 
 1977  32.3  151  67.7  86  1.8 
 1978  36.5  171  63.5  81  2.1 
 
 
Source: Based on Lippit 1987: 155. 
 
 
  2. Control over consumption through rationing of consumers’ goods 
  It is no secret that (1) the Soviet planned economy never gave priority to the production of 
consumers’ goods and (2) the subsistence level of living was used as the sole reliable 
parameter for the Soviet economic planners to organise ordinary people’s consumption. In 
other words, the Soviet planners had no desire or the necessary knowledge to improve the 
material life of the masses. Thus, in the entire Soviet history, there was no consumers’ 
revolution. What the ordinary Soviet citizens could hope for was at best Khrushchev’s 
infamous ‘goulash communism’ as the fruit of his virgin land farming campaign from the late 
1950s (Nove 1992: ch. 12). Did Mao’s economy perform better that its Soviet counterpart? 
The answer is negative. Apart from the fact that the agricultural sector was systematically 
tapped and that the industrial wages were frozen, food availability was kept very low during 
the whole of Mao’s era. 
 
  a. Low food availability 
  In 1953, China’s total grain output was 177 million metric tons for a population of some 
450 million, or 393.3 kilograms per head. In 1978, the total grain output reached 300 million 
tons for a population of 962.5 million, only 311.7 kilograms of grain per head. This was a 
drop of 21 per cent in per capita terms (Cui 1997: 10, 11, 15). Given that maintaining an 35 
adult at the subsistence level requires a minimum of 182.5 kilograms a year (0.5 kilograms of 
grain a day), it is not possible to claim that under Mao ordinary people were able to eat more 
and better. A pathetic ‘goulash communism’ was certainly not on offer. 
  In the same year (1978), a total rural surplus of 141.7 million tons (47 per cent of the total 
output) was purchased by the state as agricultural surplus. Given that by 1978 a total of 71 
per cent of China’s work force was agricultural (hence 683.4 million rural residents, see 
Table 3), the state took away 207.3 kilograms of grain from each rural resident as surplus. 
Consequently, the per capita rural grain consumption was at most 231.7 kilograms a year 
(derived from 158.3 million tons and 683.4 million rural residents) as these 231.7 kilograms 
had to cover also famine relief and seed. This is only some 20 per cent above the subsistence 
level of food consumption of 182.5 kilograms a year.  
  The remaining 29 per cent of China’s urban population, some 279.1 million, lived on 507.7 
kilograms a year. The urban citizens seemed 1.2 times better off than their rural counterparts. 
But these 507.7 kilograms a year needed to be discounted as a significant proportion of the 
141.7 million tons was utilised as industrial inputs, not for human consumption. Indeed, it 
was the norm for an urban adult to live on 180–240 kilograms of grain a year under Mao’s 
perpetual food rationing under which human calorie intake chiefly depended on grain; meat 
(and thus goulash) being regarded as a luxury.33 The subsistence living was definitely applied 
to urban China, too. It is no exaggeration that under Mao, the vast majority of the Chinese 
population were at the mercy of hunger. This inevitably affected the quality of human capital 
in China. 
  The ultimate reason for low food availability was that the planned economy allowed 
China’s food production to fall behind China’s population growth (see Table 27). Thus, the 
availability of food declined absolutely over time. The most severe decline was after the 
Great Leap Forward. In 1962, China’s per capita grain was 240 kilograms, a drop of some 40 
per cent from the 1953 level (Cui 1997: 10; Lu 1999: 46). It was not until 1984 (when 
China’s total grain output reached 400 million tons) that the per capita grain level bounced 
back to 386 kilograms, roughly the 1953 level (Wang 1996: 45). At this point, Mao’s self-
                                                 
33 Mao’s food rationing applied to each child immediately after birth. In 1978, each urban adult was granted the 
following items and quantities for each calendar month (Ling 1997: 101): 
 
 Eggs  Pork  Sugar Bean-curd  Bean  noodles 
  4  250 grams  100 grams  300 grams  50 grams  
It was not until the mid-1980s that the rationed grain consumption in urban China slowly reached 250 
kilograms, together with 25 kilograms of meat a year (Chen and Han 1995: 10). As the treat of hanger was 
constant, the life expectancies in Mao’s China had to be very poor regardless of what the official propaganda 
claimed. 36 
reliance was broken. Grain shortage led to food imports. In 1961–78, China’s net import 
totalled 59.8 million tons, or 3.5 million tons a year (Lu 1999: 46). This would feed 19.2 
million people at the subsistence level. 
 
Table 27. Growth in Total Grain Output versus Growth in Total Population 
 
 
  Year Number  Index 
 
 
A. Total grain (million tons) 
 1953  177  100 
 1978  300  169 
 Annual  growth    2.1% 
  
B. Total population (million persons) 
 1949  450.0  100 
 1958  659.9  147 
 1978  962.5  214 
 Annual  growth    2.6% 
 
 
Source: Based on Cui 1997: 10–11, 15; Jiang 1994: 70. 
 
  b. Poverty 
  It was taboo and a political crime to talk about poverty during Mao’s era. But the 
phenomenon was nation-wide. In terms of ‘relative poverty’, a term coined by Karl Marx 
referring the gap between the rich and the poor, the entire period between 1957 and 1978 was 
marred by deteriorating standards of living among the majority of the population. In rural 
China, by 1978, two-thirds of the rural population had a living standard below that of 20 
years earlier. The remaining one-third had a living standard below that of 40 years earlier 
(Ling 1997: 102–3). Indeed, the entire peasantry became seriously worse off under Mao. 
Nation-wide, things were not any better. Table 28 highlights the shortage of basic 
consumers’ items. 
 
Table 28. Decline in Actual Consumption per Capita, 1957 versus 1978 
 
 
  Grain   Oil  Meat  Sea food  Housing (I)  Housing (II)  Shops/10,000 persons 
 
 
1957  203.06 kg  2.42 kg  1.61 kg  4.34 kg  4.5 m2  11.30 m2  41.81 
1978  195.46 kg  1.60 kg  1.19 kg  3.42 kg  3.6 m2  10.17 m2  13.04 
Index* 96  66  74  79  80  90  31 
 
 
Source: Based on Zhao 2000: 100. 
Note: Housing (I) – urban China. Housing (II) – rural China. *1957=100. 
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  In terms of ‘absolute poverty’ to borrow Marx’s terminology again, Table 29 shows that 
Mao’s regime impoverished China more than the regimes did in the USSR and post-
independence India. A move towards a Pareto optimal only started after Mao (see Table 30). 
 
Table 29. Poverty Rate in China, Compared to the USSR and India  
 
 
  Year  Decades of industrialisation  % in all households 
 
 
 USSR  1967  4.0  33.0% 
 India  1968  1.5  24.2% 
 China  1978  2.5  49.3%     
 
 
Source: Based on Chaudhuri 1979: 205; Gregory and Stuart 1994: 257; Chen 2000: 132–3. 
 
Table 30. China’s Population below the Official Poverty Line (% in households), 1978–88 
 
 
     Type  1978  1980  1982 1984 1986 1988 
 
 
A. Urban sector  10.7*  10.7* 9.7 4.8 9.0 8.3 
     Index  (100)  (100)  (91)  (45)  (84)  (78) 
 
B. Rural sector (I)  65.1  51.3  32.7  18.1  15.3  15.7 
    Index  (100)  (79)  (50)  (28)  (24)  (24) 
    Rural sector (II)†  44.1  27.6  16.5  8.2  7.5  6.0 
    Index  (100)  (63)  (37)  (19)  (17)  (14) 
 
C. China’s total (I)  49.3  44.0* 30.8 17.5 15.9 15.9 
    Index  (100)  (89)  (62)  (35)  (32)  (32) 
    China’s total (II)†  31.3  19.6  14.5  7.4  6.6  5.2 
    Index  (100)  (63)  (46)  (24)  (21)  (17) 
 
 
Source: Based on Chen 2000: 132–3.34
Note: *1981 figure as a proxy. †Those below the official ‘abject poverty line’. 
 
  It is thus not surprising that the majority in Mao’s China had a hand-to-mouth existence. In 
the 1960s to 1970s, China’s overall Engel’s coefficient was as high as 0.7 (He 1994: 8). In 
1978, the Engel’s coefficient for the urban sector (16 per cent of China’s total) was 0.58. The 
                                                 
34 For more damning data see Cui 1997: 12 (indicating that in 1949–78, at least 33 per cent of rural population 
constantly lived in poverty), He 1994: 4 (demonstrating that in 1985 as many as 20 per cent of the population 
lived on less than 20 yuan a month and were on the brink of starvation), and He et al. 1997: 63 (saying that in 
1995, after two decades of vigorous efforts to alleviate poverty, at least 65 million in rural China still lived in 
absolute poverty). 38 
rural Engel’s coefficient for the rest of the 84 per cent of population was thus 0.72 (Cui 1997: 
12). Poverty was just another symptom of unsustainability in economic growth. 
  Anecdotally, compared to Khrushchev’s ‘a-goulash-per-day communism’ and Kim’s ‘an-
apple-per-day communism’ (North Korea), Mao only offered in the 1960s–70s a 
mortification communism of, ad verbum, ‘a diet of liquid food for the slack season and solid 
for the busy one’. Here, indeed no attention was given to alleviating or eliminating poverty. 
It is not difficult to imagine just how appealing Mao’s communism could be in both the short 
and long runs. As poverty perpetuated under Mao, a strategy of ‘class struggle under 
proletarian dictatorship’ was created and actively implemented to distract people’s 
attention.35 Clearly, the early maxim of ‘serving the people’ (wei renmin fuwu) during the 
Yan-an decade (1937–47) was abandoned. A new doctrine of ‘severing the people’ (luxian 
paidui, literally ‘screening the population according to Mao’s line’) in the name of class 
struggle was permanently given the policy priority.36
 
  c. Equity and Equality 
  In terms of poverty alleviation and elimination, Mao’s regime did not score well at all. But, 
what about equality? After all, Mao’s China was portrayed itself to the outside world as a 
country of egalitarianism after the elimination of private ownership and market profiteering. 
  The term ‘equality’ can be interpreted in many ways. But in essence, it is a normative 
concept which means that citizens are or should be treated equally or fairly with basic 
dignity. Thus, it is closely related to people’s rights. There is of course a vision of positivism: 
equality can mean that everyone is treated equally badly as in the case of POWs and subjects 
of a tyrant. It is thus important to use the term ‘equity and equality’ to avoid any 
misconception of the agenda. 
  It is commonly agreed that under collectivisation Chinese farmers were stripped of their (1) 
landholding rights, (2) production decision-making rights, (3) marketing rights, (4) travelling 
and migration rights. What to produce, how to produce, when to produce and for whom to 
produce were all decided by the party. Farmers had no economic and political freedom, and 
                                                 
35 Mao’s ‘class struggle under proletarian dictatorship’ was fundamentally flawed as orthodox Marxism (to be 
precise, orthodox historical materialism) associates classes only with private ownership. Thus, under 
communism there will be no class let alone class struggle. Thus, from 1957 to 1976 Mao and Maoist theocrats 
were at best busy attacking a man of straw. In contrast, Chinese traditional Confucianism is far superior in 
massaging human relations among all strata. 
36 Under Mao, snitching and tattling was vigorously encouraged as an act of loyalty to Mao. It was very 
common that family members were forced to take sides politically with severe personal consequences. Basic 
law and order broke down. As a result, cannibalism came back to parts of Maoist China (Hodgkinson 2001). 39 
instead developed personal bondage to the party machine (Cui 1997: 11–12). This resembles 
Tsarist state serfdom rather than Marxian communism. Moreover, the rural population, about 
70 to 80 per cent of China’s total, did not have the luxury of health care and pensions. This 
was not trivial in terms of what the rural population got from the hundreds of billion yuan 
they paid in taxes (including scissors pricing).  
  From the viewpoint of economy-wide income distribution and redistribution, Mao’s state 
as an economic agent (legalis homo) not only played an important role (just to mention 
forced savings) but also claimed a lion’s share of China's total GDP. This is shown in Table 
31 where the state got half the ‘cake’, which was apparently unprecedented in Chinese 
history and has to be corrected by reform. 
 
Table 31. Distribution of GDP in China, 1978 versus 1995 and Late Qing 
 
 
  State Individual  citizens 
 Government  Enterprises  Sate  total 
 
 
1978 33.5  16.1  49.6  50.4 
 
1995 13.2  18.3  31.5  68.5 
Late Qing      24.0  76.0 
 
 
Source: Based on He 1997: 62; Stover and Stover 1976: 10. 
 
  From the early analysis, it is known that throughout Mao’s era the Chinese economy had 
modest real and net growth (assuming constant prices and a constant population) and 
individual income was at best frozen. In addition, the growth was unbalanced with a clear 
bias towards heavy industry that eventually became self-serving. Under theses 
circumstances, it is almost certain that there was a ‘zero-sum’ game between the state and 
individual citizens. And it is almost certain that the state was the sole beneficiary of growth 
during Mao’s era. This can only be justified by Stalin’s ISI teleology, although whether the 
goal of industrialisation was achieved is a completely different matter. 
 Perhaps a high degree of income equality existed among ordinary citizens after the 
extraction by the state. Evidence suggests the opposite. Table 32 demonstrates that during 
Mao’s era income distribution measured by the Gini coefficient was unequal across the 
board. What this testifies to is that the ‘three major gaps’ (sanda chabie) were not reduced.  
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Table 32. Trend in Inequality Seen from the Gini Coefficient 
 
 
  Year Gini  coefficient  Index 
 
 
A. Mao’s era  1952  0.25  100 
 1958  0.37  148 
 1978  0.31  124 
 
B. Post-Mao period  1983  0.28  112 
 1992  0.33  132 
 
 
Source: Based on Zhang 1994: 41. 
 
 
G. Final remarks 
 
  First, throughout Mao’s era, China had problematic growth and problematic development: 
the growth was unbalanced and unsustainable. China seemed to start with an equilibrium by 
1954 and ended up with a severe disequilibrium in 1978. This was largely due to a lack of 
understanding of how to pursue modernisation and a lack of imagination (hence everything 
being copied from Stalin). Mao’s Great Leap Forward was not the end of the beginning of 
fast growth. Rather, it was the beginning of the end of a state failure under Maoism which 
was proved unsuited to China, a country that had a very long history of a market economy. 
Thus, despite the alleged surge in economic growth, Mao’s China remained largely rural and 
a structural change in the economy was negligible. This becomes most obvious when the real 
growth and net growth stances are revealed. 
  Second, the industrial sector became pathetically parasitic on the agricultural sector. Much 
of the industrial gain in GDP/GNP was to a great extent a result of the deliberate price 
distortion and should thus be severely discounted. Meanwhile, due to the same scissors 
pricing policy, the nominal share of the agricultural sector in China’s total GDP/GNP needs 
to be multiplied.  
  Third, Mao’s economy was not designed to enrich and empower the masses in society and 
the latter in turn responded to his policy with apathy and low morale.  
All these fundamentally challenge the notion that Mao’s period was a period of great 
economic growth and development. 37
  Now, back to Figure 1. Did Mao’s China do any better in achieving a status of a strong 
state with a rich population? Judging by China’s general track record, growth/developmental 
strategy, economic structure, economic performance and the material life of the people, the 
answer is definitely ‘No’. All these mark a clear case of state failure in the forms of 
                                                 
37 There are numerous works with romantic pro-Mao views, see for example Riskin 1987. 41 
excessive rent-seeking and economic mismanagement. All the evidence indicates that at the 
end of his life, Mao degenerated from being development-illiterate to anti-developmental. In 
short, the Maoist sate was a liability, not an asset, for China’s growth and development. And, 
Mao’s China paid a heavy price for Mao’s personal interest and propensity. 
  It was not until 1978 did a developmental state was revitalised when Deng Xiaoping 
launched his marketisation reform, an equivalent of Lenin’s NEP, with a clearly stated goal 
for the first time since 1949 of improving ordinary people’s living standards (xiaokang, 
literally meaning ‘modest prosperity’). This made it possible for China to move towards a 
combination of ‘strong state and rich population’. 42 
Appendix 
Growth Statistics and Estimates, 1949–66 
 
  Table i shows China’s nominal growth rate and Table ii shows its real and net growth rates. 
Table iii is presented as a comparison where the nominal growth is even lower than in Table 
i. 
 
Table i. Growth Statistics for Nominal Total GDP, 1949-66  (in billion yuan) 
 
  
Year Overall  growth  Pre-socialist and socialist growth 
 
  Nominal GDP  Index (I)  Index (II)  Index (III)  Index (IV)  Index (V)  Index (VI)  Index (VII) 
 
 
1949  35.8  100  100 – 100 –  – – 
1950  42.6  119  119 – 119 –  – – 
1951  49.7  139  139 – 139 –  – – 
1952  58.9  165  165 – 165 –  – – 
1953  70.9  198  198 – 198 –  – – 
1954  74.8  209  209 – 209 –  – – 
1955  78.8  220  220 – 220 –  – – 
       14.0%* 
1956 88.2  246 246  –  – 100  100  – 
1957 90.8  253 253  –  – 103  103  – 
1958  111.8†  312†  312† –  –  127†  127† – 
1959  122.2†  341†  341† –  –  139†  139† – 
1960  122.0  341 341  –  – 138  138  – 
     11.8%*  –    8.4%* 
1961 99.6  278  – 100  – 113  – 100 
1962  92.4  258  – 93  –  105  – 93 
1963  100.0  279  – 100  – 113  – 100 
1964  116.6  327  – 117  – 132  – 117 
1965  138.7  387  – 139  – 157  – 139 
1966  158.6  443  – 159  – 180  – 159 
       9.7%*      6.1%*   9.7%* 
Nominal annual    9.2%           
 
 
Source: Based on China’s Statistic Year Book 1983: 13–14, 22–3; cf. ZJB 1999: 24, 40, 51, 64–5, 76–7, 99–
100, 108–9, 128, 141, 155, 168–9, 181–2, 189–90, 197–8, 206, 261. 
Note: Index (I) – Overall growth (1949–66). Index (II) – First sub-period growth  (1949–60). Index (III) – 
Second sub-period growth (1961–6). Index (IV) – Pre-socialist growth (1949–55). Index (V) – Socialist 
growth (1956–66). Index (VI) – First socialist sub-period (1956–60). Index (VII) – Second socialist sub-
period (1961–6). *Annual growth rate for sub-period. †Figures that were inflated under the Great Leap 
Forward regime with industrial inputs and outputs which had little utility or value and agricultural outputs 
which were boasted out of proportion.  
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Table ii. Growth Statistics for Nominal and Real Total GDP, 1949–66  (in billion yuan) 
 
  
Year Nominal  Index  (I)  Real*  Index (II)   (III)   (IV)   (V)  (VI)   (VII)   (VIII) 
 
 
1949  35.8  100 35.8  100  100  –  100 – – – 
1950  42.6  119 41.7  116  116  –  116 – – – 
1951  49.7  139 47.7  133  133  –  133 – – – 
1952  58.9  165 55.3  154  133  –  133 – – – 
1953  70.9  198 65.0  182  182  –  182 – – – 
1954  74.8  209 67.0  187  187  –  187 – – – 
1955  78.8  220 68.8  192  192  –  192 – – – 
           11.5%† 
1956 88.2  246  75.0  210  210  –  – 100 100  – 
1957 90.8  253  75.1  210  210  –  – 100 100  – 
1958 111.8§  312§  89.9§  251§  251§  –  –  120§ 120§  – 
1959 122.2§  341§  95.3§  266§  266§  –  –  127§ 127§  – 
1960  122.0  341  92.1  257  257  –  – 123 123  – 
        9.0%†      5.3%† 
1961  99.6  278 72.7  203  –  100 –  97 –  100 
1962  92.4  258 65.1  182  – 90 –  87 –  90 
1963  100.0  279 67.9  190  – 93 –  91 –  93 
1964  116.6  327 76.0  212  –  105 –  101 –  105 
1965  138.7  387 86.7  242  –  119 –  116 –  119 
1966  158.6  443 94.8  265  –  130 –  126 –  130 
            4.5%†   2.3%†  – 5.4%† 
Gross annual   9.2%   5.9%  
Net annual¶   6.6%    3.3% 
 
 
Source: Based on China’s Statistic Year Book 1983: 13–14, 22–3. 
Note: Index (I) – Nominal growth (1949–66). Index (II) – Real growth  (1949–66). Index (III) – First sub-
period growth (1949–60). Index (IV) – Second sub-period growth (1961–6). Index (V) – Pre-socialist 
growth (1949–55). Index (VI) – Socialist growth (1956–66). Index (VII) – First socialist sub-period 
(1956–60). Index (VIII) – Second socialist sub-period (1961–6). 
  *Conversion is based on the average inflation rate of 2.01% per year for the period of 1950 to 1978 (Li 
1997: 49–50). †Annual growth rate for sub-period. §Figures that were inflated under the Great Leap 
Forward regime with industrial inputs and outputs which had little utility or value and agricultural outputs 
which were boasted out of proportion. ¶Net growth by discounting population growth at a rate of 2.6 per 
cent per year during 1952–80 (He 1994: 7). 
    
 
 
Table i. GDP Estimates by Wang, 1956-65 
 
 
  Year  Nominal total (million yuan) Index 
 
 
 1956  682    100 
 1960  1,055  155 
 1965  1,122  166 
 
  Nominal annual    5.8% 
 
 
Source: Based on Wang 1999: 81; cf. ZJB 1999: 99–100, 155, 205. 
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